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RECENT CASES.
BANKRUPTCY-CHATTEL MORTGAGE-URECORD)D--DisTiBuTION OF PRO-
CEEDS OF SAIE.-IN RE CANNON. IO AM. B. R. 64.-Held, where the State
law provides that all mortgages shall be valid so as to affect, from the time
of delivery or execution, the rights of subsequent creditors only when re-
corded, and the fund arising from the sale of the bankrupts' property covered
by an unrecorded chattel mortgage, is insufficient to pay in full the claims
of subsequent creditors, they are entitled to the whole fund.
The decision in this case, as the learned judge says: "Seems to be in
contravention of the fundamental principles of the Bankruptcy Law, which
is designed to secure an equal distribution of the bankrupt's estate among
all the creditors." There seems to be no direct authority upon the question.
The court argues that the mortgage being valid as to antecedent creditors,
the only claimants to the fund are the mortgagee and the subsequent cred-
itors, and the mortgage being invalid as to the latter, -they should take
the whole fund. The purpose of such recording laws is to prevent the
rights of creditors from being injured by their lack of notice of prior liens.
McKnight v. Gordon, 94 Am. Dec. 164; Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 46;
Williams v. Beard, I S. C. 313. It would seem that the decision in the pres-
ent case departed from this principle, in that the subsequent creditors are
not only protected from loss through lack of record, but are even left in
a better position than they would have been but for the existence of
the mortgage. The holding of the referee that: "The entire fund should
be divided pro rata among all creditors having allowed claims, the divi-
dend set apart to antecedent creditors being applied to the mortgage debt,"
would seem not only to be more in consonance with the objects of the
Bankruptcy act, but also to fulfil the spirit and intention of the record-
ing laws, if not their strict letter. But the opinion holds that: This could
only be by virtue of some right of subrogation, and there can be no subro-
gation to rights which do not exist; and all claims of antecedent creditors
are extinguished by the mortgage"
BANKRUPTCY-CLAIMs-SERviCES RENDERED ASSIGNEE PUOR TO ADjU-
DICTATION.-RANDOLPH V. SCRUGG, TRusTEE, I0 Am. B. R. I (S. C.) --Held,
where a general assignment for creditors made within the four months
period providles that the costs and expenses of administering the trust
shall be first paid, a claim for legal services rendered to the assignee prior
to the adjudication of bankruptcy against the assignor, and which were
beneficial to the estate, may be preferred, in the right of the assignee, as
far as he would be allowed for its payment.
In reversing the opinion of the district court Justice Holmes concludes
that whether the assignment be considered void as constructively fraudu-
lent, under section 67e of the Bankruptcy Act, or whether its void character
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be considered a necessarily implied effect of section 3 (4) which makes
such assignments acts of bankruptcy, that it must be considered void is
beyond question, for "It could not have been intended that the very con-
veyance which warranted putting the grantor into bankruptcy should with-
draw all his property from distribution there." But the assignment was
not illegal. Being permitted by the State law it was not prohibited by the
Bankruptcy act unless and until proceedings in bankruptcy were instituted.
In re Sievers, 91 Fed. 366. Being lawful when rendered the services raise a
valid debt. Re Lanis, Fed. Cas. No. 7989. However, as these services were
rendered to the assignee, the claim therefor must be worked out through
him. Central R. and Bkg. CO. v. Pettus, 113 U. S. 116. The assignee,
acting lawfully in *hat he does before proceedings are begun, in so far
as his services are beneficial to the estate is entitled to an allowance for
them, which should not be denied through the mere fiction of a void relation-
ship. Platt v. Archer, Fed. Cas. No. 11,214. McDonald v. Moore, Fed.
Cas. No. 8,763. Such allowance is to be regarded as a deduction from the
property which the assignee is required to surrender, and in that way it
gains a preference. Platt v. Archer, supra; Re Scholtz, io6 Fed. 834. White
v. Hill, 148 Mass. 396.
BANKRUPTCY-SUBROGATION OF Suarr Y-SEcrioN 57i.-LMrNGSTON V.
HEiNEMAN, IO AM. B. R. 39 (C. C. A.).-Held, that a surety upon notes
of the bankrupt, upon paying the same, is, under section 57i of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, subrogated to the rights of the creditor, cum onere, and can only
participate in the distribution of the estate when he restores preferential
payments received by the creditor.
Section 57i of the Banruptcy Act provides that the surety of the bank-
rupt, discharging the obligation shall be subrogated to the rights of the
creditor. Section 57q provides that creditors who have received preferences
shall not have their claims allowed unless they surrender such preferences.
This decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Sixth Circuit reversing
that of the district court, and a similar decision, In re Amasa Lyon, io Am.
B. R. 25, just handed down in the second circuit confirm the weight of au-
thority as to the construction of these sections. Notwithstanding ingenious
efforts of district judges in this and other cases, see In re Siegel-Hillman
Co., ii Fed. 98o, to relieve the surety of the burden of returning the prefer-
ence, by the plain weight of authority, the surety, under these sections,
stands exactly in shoes of the creditor taking his claims, "subject to all
the limitations and disqualifications attached to them in the hands of his
predecessor." Houston v. Bank, 25 Ala. 250; Swarts v. Seigel, 117 Fed. 13.
The conclusion reached in the Seventh Circuit, Doyle v. Milwaukee Bank,
1i6 Fed. 295, that the surety need not return the preference because he was
not "in the same class" (Section 6oa, Preferred Creditors) with ordinary
creditors is deprived of all weight by the recent amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Act by which the preferences which must be returned are carefully
defined as those void or voidable under sections 6ob and 67e, i. e., those into
which some element of fraud enters; in substance a return to the rule
adopted in the former act of 1867.
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CARRIERs-FALURE TO PURCHASE TICKES--EXCESS FARE.-FuLMER V.
SOUTHERNT Ry. Co., 45 S. E. i96 (S. C.).-Held, that a railroad company
cannot charge passengers boarding trains without tickets an excess fare over
the maximum rate fixed by statute, although a rebate for said excess is
given. Jones, Woods, Townsend, and Gage, JJ., dissenting.
The ruling of the main opinion is based on the argument that the issu-
ance of a rebate check allows the railroad company the use of the money
until the check is cashed in. This brings the rate above the maximum fixed
by statute. The reports show but two cases directly in point. Baltimore
& Y. Turnpike Road v. Boone, 45 Md. 344, supports the view of the majority.
Fetter, Carriers, Vol. I, p. 7oo4, remarks that on principle the passenger
ought not to be put to the trouble of having refunded an-excess charge which
the company had no right to make in the first place. Reese v. Railroad Co.,
131 Pa. St. 422, is in direct conflict with Turnpike Road v. Boone, supra.
Such excess charge and rebate check is held to be not in contravention of
the statute. The "reasonableness of the regulation" is the ground for this
decision. The necessity of the system overbalances the fine line of over-
charging as drawn in the Maryland case. Justice to the railroads and
convenience to the public will require courts to follow the rule laid down
in Reese v. Ry. Co., supra.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLIcE PowER-UsE OF TRADING STAMPs.-YOUNG
v. COMMONWEALTH, 45 S. E. 327 (VA.)-Held, that a statute prohibiting the
use of trading stamps is in contravention of the Constitution of the United
States, 14 Amd., sec. I, as an infringement on personal liberty.
State v. Dalton, 46 Atl. 234 (R. I.), on which the opinion relies, presents
the first decision bearing directly on the rights of the State, by police power,
to abolish the so-called "trading stamp evil." Police power is the only
source of authority by which a State may enact legislation of this character.
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133. The
constitution of the United States so limits the exercise of this power that
property rights shall not be arbitrarily or unreasonably infringed by State
legislatures. Rubstrat v. People, i85 Ill. 133; Perry v. Comm., i55 Mass.
117; Goodcharles v,. Wigeman, 133 Pa. St. 431. The ruling is well taken.
The above decision supported, by State v. Dalton, supra, seems to have
established the fact that the trading stamp system cannot be disturbed by
State action.
CORPORATIONS CREATED 3Y CONGRESS-GRANT OF PowER TO SUE AND BE
SUED--LABILITY FOR TORTS.-OERHOLSER v. NATIONAL HOME, 67 N. F- 487
(OHIO).-Through the negligence of the defendant a large quantity of oil
and water was discharged upon the land of the plaintiff in such a manner
as to destroy his crops. Held. that the "home" is a corporation for the
purpose of performing an appropriate and constitutional function of Congress
and although the power to sue and be sued is conferred, yet it cannot be
sued for a tort.
The reasoning in this case rests on the principle that the "home" is
an instrument of government. Bigelow v. Inhabitants of Randolph, 14 Gray
541. A suit against a corporation performing only governmental functions
is a suit against the government and hence can only be maintained when
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consent is given by the sovereign. U. S. v. Gleeson, 124, U. S. 225. In as
much as the United States has not given jurisdiction for claims against it
for torts its instrumentalities cannot be held liable therefor. Barnes v. Dist.
ot Columbia, 91 U. S. 540, 552; Schillinger v. U. S., 155 U. S. 163. The
government is not liable for the negligence or misfeasance of its officers.
Robertson v. Sibel, 127 U. S. 507. Nevertheless Congress has power to pay
claims or debts which rest upon mere equitable or honorary obligation. U. S.
v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427.
COPORAnTIONs-EXAMINATION OF BOOKS-REFUSAL-PENALTY-.--Cox v.
PAuL, 67 N. E. 58o (N. Y.).-The Stock Corporation Law imposes a. penalty
on each officer of the corporation who refuses to exhibit the stock book to
a member, and also a like penalty upon the corporation. Plaintiff applied
to the secretary for permission to inspect the book but was refused. The
next day a like demand was refused. The day following a demand was made
upon the president, which was refused but subsequently complied with.
Held, that these interviews amounted to but one demand and one refusal on
one occasion and not on several occasions. Parker, C. J., Martin and Werner,
JJ., dissenting.
This seems to be a very strict construction of the statute. It was said
that the statute being penal in its nature should not be extended, and that
ordinarily one penalty would secure the end as effectually as many. But it
would seem that had the president thought there would be but one liability
the plaintiff would have been obliged to seek legal aid to inspect the books.
The court next proceeds to rest its decision upon the arbitrary rule that a
party suing for penalties can recover but for one violation prior to the
commencement of the action and relies on Jones v. Rochester Gas & El. Co.,
168 N. Y. 65, as sanctioning that doctrine, but in that case the penalty was
continuing and it was held that after an action was brought another request
was necessary to start the running of the -penalty anew. In the principle
case it would seem that each refusal to permit the plaintiff to examine the
books constituted a separate wrong as no injury need be shown. Kelsey v.
Pfandler Process Fermentation Co., 3 N. Y. Supp. 723.
CRIMINAL LAW-MAIMAGE OF WITNEss BEFORE TRIAL-TESTIMONY-
PajxUDIcrAL ERRoR.-MooPE v. STAT , 75 S. W. 497 (TEx.).-Accused married
an eye witness to the crime the day before the trial. The State merely proved
by the wife the date of the marriage. Held, that such proceeding was
prejudicial error, in that it aided the theory of the prosecution that defendant
married the witness to suppress her testimony. Henderson, )., dissenting.
The bare right of the State to call a witness under the circumstances
above was, at common law, a mooted question of evidence. In Redley u
Welleflley, 3 C. & P. 558, the wife was considered incompetent; also the
husband in Rex v. Sergeant, i Ry. & M. 352. These cases formed an ex.
ception to the rule that a witness cannot, by his own acts, deprive the other
party of a right to the testimony. Greeni., Ev., secs. 167, 418 (5th ed.),
and cases cited. The principle, rendering a wife an incompetent witness
against her husband in criminal actions, except in an offense, one against
the other, does not rest on the discretion of the parties. Stein v. Bowman,
13 Pet. 209. This rule of exclusion is binding upon the court. 3 Jones, Ev.,
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sec. 757; Greeni., Ev., sec. 34o (5th ed.). The testimony of a polygamous
wife was held cause for reversal in Bassett v. United States, 137 U. S. 496.
To test competency, either the man or the woman may be examined on the
voir dire as to marriage, Seeley v. Engell, vc N. Y. 542, but to establish the
marriage, proof aliunde must be adduced. By admitting that which the
witness is used to prove she is a fortiori incompetent.
CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-DEFECT TICET-EJECTION-REMEDY.-
WESTERN MARYLAND R. Co. V. SCHAUN, 55 Atl. 701 (Md.).-Because of a
defect in her return ticket, due to the negligence of the conductor on the
outgoing trip, plaintiff was ejected from the defendant's train. Held, that
plaintiff could recover in an action ex contractu only, and not in one ex de-
lecto.
There are decisions which hold that, in such circumstances, the passen-
ger must either pay his fare or leave the train, and sue ex contractu
Hall v. M. & C. R. Co., 15 Fed. 57; Townsend v. R. Co., 56 N. Y. 295.
But the weight of authority is that he may resist ejection, and recover
damages therefor. New York etc., R. Co. v. Winters. 143 W. S. 6o; Lake
Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Fix, 88 Md. 381; Wood, R. R's., sec. 349. In Massa-
chusetts a distinction is drawn between those cases where the passenger could
have perceived the defect in the ticket upon receiving it and where he
could not. Murdock v. R. Co., 137 Mass. 293. The form of action usually
adopted is one in tort. Laird v. Traction Co., I66 Pa. St. 4; Gorman v.
R. Co., 97 Cal. I. But it would seem that the same result could be reached
in one ex contractu. Johnson v. R. Co., 46 Fed. 347.
EMINENT DOMAIN-RAILROADS-EREcTION OF VrADUCT-STATIONS.-
DOLAN Er AL. V. Naw YORK & HARLEM R. Co., 67 N. E. 612 (N. Y.).-The
legislature ordered the erection of a steel viaduct through Park avenue.
Upon completion the defendant was required to run its trains over it instead
of through a depressed cut and over the highway. It was also required
that stations which occupied more of the road than the viaduct, be erected.
Held, that no damages could be recovered by reason of the construction of
the viaduct or operation of trains thereon, but damages may be awarded as a
consequence of the erection of the stations.
In most of the cases concerning the Park avenue viaduct in New York
City there has been a dissenting opinion and no little difficulty has confronted
the courts to ascertain precisely the rule to be followed. Dolan v. N. Y. &
H. R. Co., 77 N. Y. Supp. 815. The decision reached in the case under
discussion and which seems to define the law is that the building of the
viaduct in place of the cut is a public improvement effected through a
governmental agency, and hence the defendant is not liable to abutting
property owners for damages resulting from the operation of its trains
thereon, but the stations are ordered to be erected to afford suitable facilities
for the public, and where they interfere with the easements of light, air and
access the company is liable. It seems quite impossible, however, to reconcile
the first proposition with the decision in Lewis v. N. Y. & H. R. Co., I6a
N. Y. 2o2.
Ex POST FACTO LAw-STATUTORY CHANGE OF PUNISHMENT BETWEEN
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE.-STATE v. ROONEY, 95 N. W. 513 (N. D.).-After
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the conviction of the defendant for murder, and before sentence, a new
statute went into effect extending the time after sentence within which the
judgment of death should be carried into effect. Held, that the statute was
not ex post facto as to the defendant for the reason that the extension of time
was a mitigation and not an increase of punishment.
The a;gument of the court is (I) that death is the extreme penalty
that can be inflicted; (2) any change of penalty short of that is a mitigation;
and (3) postponement of the time of its infliction is also a mitigation. The
only authority directly in point on the third proposition is People v. McNulty,
93 Cal. 427, which is directly opposed to the present decision. (Three
justices dissented.) In In re Petty, 22 Kan. 477, the subsequent statute
.extended the time within which the execution must take place from eight
weeks to not less than one year, and provided further, that it should take
place there only upon the issuance of the governor's warrant; held, ex post
facto and void. And the decision was the same in respect to a similar statute
in Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 95; although the doctrine there laid down
that any alteration in the manner of punishment is necessarily ex post facto
as to one convicted before the going into effect of the alteration has been
repudiated. People v. Hayes, i4o N. Y. 484.
INDEMNITY INSURANCE-CONsTRUCTION OF PoLIcY-LEGAL EXPENSES.-
CORNELL V. TRAVFLEa's INS. Co., 67 N. E. 578 (N. Y.).-An indemnity
insurance policy provided for the liability of the insurers in case of accidental
injury caused in the course of business of the insured to persons other than
employes, and made it the duty of the insurer to negotiate settlement of such
claims. Election was given to the company, in event of suit, to pay the full
amount of its liability to the insured or defend the proceedings, consent in
writing being necessary to bind it. Held, that the insurer was not liable for
the successful defense by the insured of suits brought against him without
legal basis. Cullen, Vann and Werner, JJ., dissenting.
The court decided that the obligation of the insurer to defend claims
against the insured included only valid claims, since it is not unusual for
business men to be sued on claims without just basis and, in such a case,
the plaintiff must bear the loss as it was not insured against. The dissenting
opinion is based on the proposition that the insurers should defend claims
of such a character that if established, they would be liable. In the cases
cited in support of this contention, the language seems to have been broader
than in the case under discussion and did not restrict indemnity to "circum-
stances which shall impose on the insured a liability to the person injured"
as above.
INJUNcTION-GROUNDS OF REMEDY-STRIKES.-MASTER HORSESHOERS, ETC.,
v. QUINLIvAN, 82 N. Y. Supp. 288.-Defendants, a voluntary association
of journeymen, demanded that plaintiff, an incorporated association of master
mechanics, should permit them to affix their stamp, or trademark, to the
work done by them in the shops of plaintiff's members. Upon refusal of
the demand defendants declared a strike. Held, an injunction may be had
restraining defendants from committing acts of violence against members
of plaintiff association or their employes. Van Brunt, P. J., and Ingraham,
J., dissenting.
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The injunction is asked for on the ground that plaintiff's use of its
own trademark is being injured. The right to a trademark is a property
right, which will be protected. United States v. Steffens, ioo U. S. 82. The
plaintiff is not an employer of labor itself, but its members employ labor, and
the strike is against certain of the members. In a strong dissenting opinion,
Ingraham, J., contends that the plaintiff association,' not being the party
against whom the strike is directed, is not entitled to relief, on the ground
that a corporation cannot sue for damages to its individual members. Bank
v. McKenna, 32 Minn. 468. This seems to be the sounder view, and no cases
can be found to support the prevailing opinion.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-SALE WITHOUT A LICENsE-SocAL CLUB.-PEoPiU
v. LAW AND ORDER CLUB, 67 N. E. 855 (ILL).-Defendant, a club formed for
"social and, literary" purposes, sold tickets to its members which they used
to pay for liquors at the club bar. The price of the tickets was sufficient
only to pay the cost of the liquors. Held, to be a "sale" without license,
contrary to the statute.
On the question of the right of a social club to supply its members with
intoxicating liquors without taking out a liquor license, there is an irrecon-
cilable conflict of authority. Some courts uphold the right on the ground
that the so-called "sale' is merely an equitable method of distributing the
common property of the members. Tennessee Club v. Dwyer, 79 Tenn. 452;
People v. Adelphi Club, 149' N. Y. 5. Other courts hold that where the club
sells intoxicants in a private manner, only to members and guests, and not
with a view to profit, it is not a "sale" within the statute. State v. Austin
Club, 89 Tex. 20; Piedmont Club v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 540. On the
other hand, there are not a few courts which, as in the present case, deny
absolutely the right of the club to slipply liquors to its members, and regard
all attempts to do so as mere attempts to evade the statute. Kentucky Club
v. Louisville, 92 Ky. 309; State v. Social Club, 73 Md. 98; State v. Essex
Club, 53 N. J. Law 99. The authorities seem to be about evenly divided.
LIBEL-ADVERTISmENT-AScRIPTIoN OF UNcHIASTnTY-INUxiNOM.--MoR-
SON v. SmITH, 82 N. Y. SUP'. i66.-Defendant's magazine contained an ad-
vertisement of a book. The advertisement was so worded as to give an
impression that the book was immoral. Accompanying the advertisement
and forming a part of it was plaintiff's picture. Plaintiff alleged that the
meaning intended was that she was the subject of an "unchaste and indecent"
experience Held, that though perhaps libelous per se, the libel failed to
support the inuendo, and no action could be maintained. Laughlin and
Patterson, JJ., dissenting.
Where the language of an alleged libel is ambiguous, the court may
properly refuse to strike from the complaint the inuendoes averring the
meaning which plaintiff claimed should be attached to the words complained
of. Barnard v. Pub. Co., 17 N. Y. Supp. 573. If that which is alleged can be
reasonably imputed to the words complained of, then the allegation of such
meaning was proper. Gault v. Babbitt, I Ill. App. i3o. It is a question for
the .jury which meaning would on the occasion in question have reasonably
been given. Smith v. Gafford, 33 Ala. 168. Newell on Defamation, Slander
and Libel, 286. Where the words are actionable per se, an inuendo may
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be treated as surplusage. Crosswell v. Weed, 25 Wend. 621. Schmisseur v.
Kreilich, 92 Ill. 347. But it does not render the complaint demurrable on
the ground that the facts do not constitute a cause of action. Kraus v.
Sentinel Co., 6o Wis. 425.
SHERIFFS-FALSE AmsT-LiAmIuTy OF SURETIES.-STATE EX REL. BREMAN
v. DIERKER, 74 S. W. 153 (Mo.).-Held, that the sureties of a sheriff on his
official bond, are not liable for an arrest by him, without a warrant, for a
misdemeanor not committed in his view, although he believed he was acting
officially. Reyburn, J., dissenting.
The sureties of a sheriff are liable for his acts done Virtute offlcii, but
whether or not they are liable for acts done colore ofiicii is a matter con-
cerning which there is a conflict of authority. Sureties were held not liable
in Gerber v. Achley, 37 Wis. 43; Huffnmn v. Koppelkon, 8 Neb. 344; People
ex rel. Comstock v. Lucas, 93 N. Y. 585. The distinction is well drawn in
Thomas v. Connelly, io4 N. C. 342. The ruling above follows an opinion of
the same court in State v. McDonough, 9 Mo. App. 63. The apparent weight
of authority, however, is in favor of binding the sureties under the circum-
stances of this case. Lammon et al. v. Fensier, III U. S. 17, gives a very
complete collection of the conflicting State decisions.
SUICIDE-CRIMINAL OFFENSE.-STATE V. CARNEY, 55 ATL. 44 (N. J.).-
Held, an attempt at suicide is an indictable offense in New Jersey.
The principle is well founded that a criminal is not excused by having
any one's permission. Suicide, therefore, like any other murder, is a common
law felony. Rex v. Russell, I Moody 356; Hales v. Petit, i Plow. 253; 4
Bl. Conn., 94, 95; and is still considered a criminal offense. Comm v. Mink,
123 Mass. 422. The court of Hawaii in Rex v. Absee, 2 Am. Law Rev. 794,
deeming the punishment for murder and the attempt to murder not to apply
to self-murder, held as a consequence that an attempt at suicide could not
be punished. Where the question is not covered by statute, as in this case,
the attempt as a general rule will be punishable as a felony. Comm v.
Dennis, io5 Mass. 162; Darrow v. Fund Society, 116 N. Y. 537. Contra,
Dawes on Crimes, 72.
WATERcoURSEs-RIPARIAN AND NON-RIPARIAN OwNERs-RIGHTS.-DoRE-
ILus v. PATERSON, 55 Am 304 (N. 3.)-Held, that the rights of non-riparian
lessees and grantees of the right to take water from a canal flowing out of a
river above tidewater are subordinate to the right of a city located above
the intake of the canal to vent its sewage into the stream. Hendrickson and
Pitney, J., dissenting.
The right of a riparian proprietor in a watercourse is said to be an
inseparable incident of his property right in the land bordering the stream.
Johnson v. Jordan, 2 Met. 234, 239; Corning v. Troy Factory, 39 Barb. 311.
Yet the owner can grant to another the right to use the stream; Kensit v.
R. Co., L. R. 27 Ch. D. 122; Gould v. Stafford, 91 Col. 146; though not as
against the lower proprietor, if it causes them injury; Higgins v. Flemington
Water Ca., 36 N. .. Eq. 538; Heilborn v. Fowler Co., 75 Col. 426. The
grant gives rights only against the grantor. Ormerod v. Todmorden Co.,
L R. ii Q. B. D. 155. Yet from this it would seem to follow that, if an
upland proprietor pollutes the river to the damage of the grantee, the grantor
may indirectly recover; for his damage from the pollution is measured by the
decrease in the rental value of his land. Ferguson v. Mfg. Co., 77 Iowa 576;
Seely v. Alden, 61 Pa. St. 302.
